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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: MS. CHRISTENSEN CITES TO AN INCORRECT 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
The standard of review cited by Ms. Christensen is incorrect for the 
issue presented in this case. Ms. Christensen cites a "reasonableness" 
standard of review which is not correct. The standard of review for the 
sole issue presented in this appeal is a correction of error standard. In 
Esquivel v. Labor Comm'n. 2000 UT 47, 982 P.2d 87, the Court 
articulated the proper standard of review for administrative proceedings. 
It stated: 
matters of statutory construction are questions of law, 
reviewed for correctness. . . . An exception to this general rule 
exists if the legislature has either explicitly or implicitly 
granted discretion to the agency. However, absent a grant of 
discretion, an agency's interpretation or application of a 
statutory term should be reviewed under the correction of 
error standard. 
Id. at TITf 13-14; see also LPI Services v. Labor Commission, 2007 UT. 
App. 375, 173 P.3d 858. 
Utah's appellate courts have routinely held that whether the trial 
court selected the applicable law is a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. See 4447 Assoc, v. First Sec. Fin.. 973 P.2d 992, 995 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1999); Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); 
1 
Shaw v. Layton Constr. Co.. 872 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(whether court applied the correct law is a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness). Such is the case here. 
This appeal stems from the Commission's error in concluding that 
Ms. Christensen's activities while working for Smiths Food and Drug over 
several months should be classified as an industrial accident rather than 
as an occupational disease under Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-401 versus 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-3-103 et seq. In other words, the issue presented 
involves whether the Commission selected and applied the correct law in 
this case — ie., Utah Worker's Compensation Act versus the Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. Given that the issue involved is one of general 
law, no deference need be given to the Commission and no marshaling of 
facts need be had. l 
1
 Since Appellants do not challenge the underlying facts, there is 
no need to "marshall the evidence" as argued by Ms. Christensen in her 
Brief. 
2 
POINT 2: SINCE MS. CHRISTENSEN DID NOT CORRECTLY 
FILE HER CASE AS AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE, 
SHE IS NOT ALLOWED ANY RECOVERY UNDER 
UTAH LAW. 
Ms. Christensen asserts that this Appellate Court and the Labor 
Commission, cannot sua sponte change an injured worker's theory of 
relief in a case. See Hilton Hotel v. Industrial Commission, 897 P.2d 352 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). This statement of law is correct. See id.; Acosta v. 
Labor Commission, 2002 UT App 67, 44 P.3d 819. 
Indeed, the Court held in Hilton Hotel that the Commission erred in 
entering an order outside the issues and theories presented in a case 
when a theory was never addressed as part of an injured worker's case. 
See id. The court held similarly in Acosta when an Administrative Law 
Judge adjudicated a cumulative trauma theory of relief when it was not 
raised in pleadings by the worker. However, what Ms. Christensen fails 
to recognize is that, as the moving party, she still carries the burden of 
filing an Application for Hearing under the correct theory of relief. In 
this case, the correct basis of relief for any possible recovery is the Utah 
Occupational Disease Act.2 Since the material facts of the claim qualify 
as an occupational disease claim rather than as an industrial accident 
2
 Although she originally filed her claim to include an occupational 
theory of relief for the period of 1994 to 2002, she subsequently 
withdrew that claim at the evidentiary hearing. (R., 35; R. 172). 
3 
claim, Ms. Christensen was required to file her claim as an occupational 
disease rather than as industrial accident. Since she failed to properly 
do so, this Court should recognize that her claims should have been filed 
as an occupational disease and dismiss her claim. Smith's further 
agrees that under Utah law, the Court should not and cannot under 
Utah law now, "convert" her claim sua sponte into an occupational 
disease claim given her improper filing and unilateral decision to 
withdraw her original occupational disease claim. 
POINT 3: MS. CHRISTENSEN'S CLAIM IS NOT AN INDUSTRIAL 
"ACCIDENT" AND SHOULD NOT BE ADJUDICATED 
UNDER THE UTAH WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT 
Ms. Christensen also argues that the definition of "accident" under 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-401 is not limited to single exertion injuries. On 
this basis, she argues that her claim could be filed and adjudicated as an 
industrial accident under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act on the 
basis of a "repetitive" or "cumulative trauma" accident claim. 
Ms. Christensen is correct that Utah law does permit relief in 
certain cases under the Worker's Compensation Act for accidents that 
occur as a result of "cumulative trauma". See Nyrhen v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 800 P.2d 330 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). However, the facts of this 
4 
case are far different than those cited by Ms. Christensen which are very 
narrow in holding. 
First, the present case involves repetitive activities that spanned 
over a period of at least five months, much longer than the repetitive time 
period identified in Nyrhen. For instance, in Nyhren the Court held 
that a 2lA month period of cumulatively lifting tubs of merchandise 
qualified as an "accident" under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act. 
The period of exposure in this case is much longer. See also Dale T. 
Smith & Sons v. Utah Labor Common, 2009 UT 19, 208 P.3d 533 
(occupational disease act applies to low back condition occurring during 
course of twenty year period). 
Second, unlike the cases cited by Ms. Christensen, her neck 
condition is better classified as gradually developing over time with no 
exact starting point, indicative of an occupational disease. See Thompson 
v. Industrial Commission, 23 P.2d 930 (Utah 1933). Indeed, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that if an injury is incurred gradually in the 
course of the employment, and there is no specific event or occurrence 
known as the starting point, it is held to be an occupational disease, and 
not an injury resulting from accident. See id. In Schmidt v. Industrial 
5 
Commission, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980), the court held that an accident 
must have a definite time and place. See id. Such is the case here. 
Ms. Christensen's testimony at hearing was that her work activities 
of lifting and carrying large vats of cheese occurred while working as a 
cheese cook for Smith's in July or August, 2001 through November 20, 
2001, ultimately causing her neck condition. She was unable to specify 
the starting point of her neck pain in time and place. Under Utah case 
law, it is evident that an accident, even when occurring over time due to 
cumulative activities, must still be "definitely located as to time and 
place." See Thompson, 23 P.2d at 933. Ms. Christensen cannot 
identify an exact starting point as to time or place of her neck problems 
at work. In fact, she testified at hearing that she first felt neck pain 
when driving her car and not while at work performing her job duties 
from Smith's. (R., 191, Tr. 83-84). Given this, Ms. Christensen's claim 
must be classified as an occupational disease rather tham as an 
industrial accident. 
6 
POINT 4: THE COMMISSION'S RULING LENDS TOWARDS 
UNCERTAINTY AND CONFUSION IN FUTURE 
LITIGATION 
The import of this decision has a profound effect on public policy 
and the filing of future claims at the Utah Labor Commission. It is 
evident that Ms. Christensen could have filed an Application for Hearing 
under the Utah Occupational Disease Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-101 
et seq. She likely chose not to do so because the Occupational Disease 
Act ("ODA") allows for apportionment of medical and indemnity 
compensation under Utah Code Ann. §34A-3-l 10 for non-industrial 
conditions. The Utah Worker's Compensation Act does not have a 
similar provision. In other words, by filing under the ODA, she would 
likely get less worker's compensation benefits since the ALJ is required 
to apportion between industrial and non-industrial conditions. To allow 
an applicant different avenues of recovery under the Utah worker's 
compensation system causes confusion and provides lack of judicial 
uniformity in decisions. Utah's courts have held that the worker's 
compensation statute must be interpreted not only from the judicial, but 
also from a social point of view, so as to give material justice it is due, 
while formal jurisprudence has to stand back. See Ogden Iron Works v. 
7 
Industrial Common. 102 Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376 (1942). We ask that the 
court do so here. 
In Masich, the Court examined the history and purpose of the 
Occupational Disease Act and the Worker's Compensation Act. The 
court held: 
If we hurriedly scan the history and development of the law of 
compensation in this country, we first find the legislatures 
and courts dealing with accidental injuries arising out of or in 
the course of employment. These acts covered [*107] the 
employee who was accidentally injured in the [***7] course of 
his employment, but failed to cover an employee who was 
rendered ill because of an occupational disease. Some 
jurisdictions extended the coverage of the act to include 
occupational diseases, but for the most part the employee 
suffering from an occupational disease was left to his 
common law right of action. 
In this state the Workmen's Compensation Act, Utah Code 
1943, 42-1-1 et seq., was construed to involve only accidental 
injuries, so that when an employee suffered an occupational 
disease, he was confronted with the necessity of establishing 
actual negligence on the part of the employer and was 
confronted by the common law defenses then available to the 
employer. This court recognized that the legislature had not 
occupied the field of occupational diseases when the 
Workmen's Compensation Act was passed; and so the 
employee suffering from disease was limited to his common 
law right of action. See Young v. Salt Lake City, 97 Utah 123, 
90 P. 2d 174 (1939) 
Shortly after this court decided the Young v. Salt Lake City 
case, supra, the legislature enacted the Occupational Disease 
Statute. Much of the wording of this act was taken from the 
Workmen's Compensation Act, . . . . 
8 
In newly enacted legislation it is sometimes necessary in 
order to determine the legislative intent, to scrutinize an act 
to the extent of dealing with [***9] or transposing a phrase, a 
single word, or even a punctuation mark; but no such refined 
scrutiny is necessary in this case. This for the reason that for 
many years our legislature has been dealing with a 
companion act similar in phraseology and context; the 
Workmen's Compensation Act has been passed on repeatedly 
by this court, and the legislature has been content to accept 
the construction placed on that act by this court. HN7 The 
intent, purposes and objectives of the Occupational Disease 
Act, which is closely allied to the Workmen's Compensation 
Act, can be determined by reliance on former interpretations 
of the Workmen's Compensation Act without searching 
through the refinements [**616] of construction necessary, 
had the former act not been before the legislature on many 
occasions. In addition, the legislative intent in the 
Occupational Disease Statutes does not depend on the 
correlation or arrangement of words alone. Other and 
different reasons can be considered. One of the cardinal 
principles of statutory construction is that the courts will look 
to the reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated 
by the entire context and subject matter of the statute dealing 
[***10] with the subject. 
With this principle to guide us, we analyze the effect of the two 
interpretations of the Disease Act, as suggested by counsel for 
the respective parties. . . . 
[*116] If we were to adopt the first construction contended for, 
we would not only upset what has been long regarded as the 
law of this state in the accidental injury field, we would 
further render the Occupational Disease Act so confusing, 
uncertain and impractical that proper administration 
would be almost impossible Without detailing all of 
the difficulties to be encountered were such an 
interpretation rendered, enough have been mentioned to 
indicate that one of the beneficent purposes of such 
[***26] acts, to avoid litigation, lessen expense thereof, 
and afford an efficient and speedy tribunal to determine 
9 
and award compensation, would be thwarted. 
HN10 The duty of a court to avoid a construction that will 
result in confusion or uncertainty is a duty recognized by 
all. The general rule in this regard is stated as follows, in 
50 Am. Jur . , Statutes, Par. 382: 
In the interpretation of statutes, a court should be 
astute in avoiding a construction which may be 
productive of much litigation and insecurity, or 
which would throw the meaning or administration 
of [*117] the law, or the forms of business, into 
hopeless confusion or uncertainty. Indeed, it has 
been declared that statutes should never be given 
a construction that leads to uncertainty or 
confusion, if it is possible to construe them 
otherwise. Hence, an interpretation should, if 
possible, be put upon the provisions of a law 
which will permit the officials having the 
responsibility for its administration to proceed 
in an orderly manner. A particular construction 
will also be favored where it appears to be the 
only one which will afford a fixed, permanent, 
and certain rule to ascertain whether a 
particular case is included [***27] within or 
excluded from the operation of the statute. 
Similarly, where the construction of a statute 
involves a choice between uncertainties, the lesser 
should be chosen. . . . 
Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 106-
117 (Utah 1948). 
In this case, the Commission's interpretation of the Worker's 
Compensation Act lends to confusion and uncertainty for future litigation 
of cases where the worker's medical problem slowly progresses over time, 
10 
and is contributed to by both non-industrial and industrial factors or 
conditions. Under the Commission's interpretation of the term "accident", 
Ms. Christensen's work events qualify under both the definitions of 
"accident" and "occupational disease" and could be filed under either the 
Occupational Disease Act or Worker's Compensation Act. It is evident 
from the history of Utah law noted above, and other cases,3 that the 
legislature did not intend that the terms "accident" and "occupational 
disease" be interpreted and applied interchangeably. This Court should 
fashion an interpretation of the term "accident" to permit officials having 
the responsibility for its administration to proceed in an orderly manner. 
Or in the alternative, provide clear interpretation that a slowly 
progressing medical condition must be classified as an occupational 
disease and not as an industrial accident. See id., 117. We submit that 
this court should enunciate a clear standard in which to define an 
accident versus that of an occupational disease and clarify the proper 
standard for each. 
3
 Carling v. Industrial Comm'n. 16 Utah 2d 260 (Utah 1965); 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi. 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981); Thompson v. 
Industrial Commission, 23 P.2d 930 (Utah 1933). 
11 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments set forth herein, Smith's requests that 
the Court of Appeals reverse the Commission's Order Affirming ALJ's 
Decision dated March 16, 2009, and hold that the Occupational Disease 
Act applies to Ms. Christensen's claim for workers' compensation benefits 
rather that the Utah Worker's Compensation Act. 
Respectfully submitted this /& '* day of May, 2010. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
/W^AVwu^ 
Bret A. Gardner 
Kristy L, Bertelsen 
Attorneys for Appellants, Smith's Food 
& Drug 
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